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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
Latin America with a Granger causality test and impulse response functions in a panel vector 
autoregression model. Using annual observations from a sample of 18 countries from 1962 to 
2005, it is shown that while economic growth causes financial development, financial 
development does not cause economic growth. This finding is robust to different model 
specifications and different financial indicators. Interestingly, when the sample is divided 
according to different income levels and institutional quality, there is two way causality between 
financial development and economic growth only for the middle income group and for countries 
with stronger rule of law and creditor rights. The impulse response functions show that a shock 
to financial development has a positive impact on economic growth only for these subsamples, 
but the net effect of financial development on growth is relatively small.    
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1. Introduction 
 During the 1980s, most Latin American countries suffered from distorted financial 
systems. In this decade the government kept interest rate controls, allocated credit arbitrarily, and 
deterred the expansion of security markets and the creation of new financial institutions 
(Edwards 1999). Nonetheless, there has been a significant improvement on the levels of financial 
development in the region. While credit to the private sector as a share of Gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the Latin American region was on average 12 percent in the 1960s, it grew to 
an average of 29 percent in the early 2000s.
1
 Even though Latin American countries experienced 
significant financial reforms in the 1990s that promoted financial deregulation and the growth of 
the stock market, financial development indicators show that the region is financially 
underdeveloped when compared to other emerging regions.
2
 Therefore, lack of financial depth 
may be a barrier to better economic performance in Latin America.  
 The link between financial development and economic growth is complex since the 
direction of causation between the two variables may run both ways. Theoretical and empirical 
analyses support causality running from financial development to economic growth (supply-
leading hypothesis), but there is also evidence that economic growth causes financial 
development (demand-following hypothesis). It has also been posited that the relationship 
between financial development and growth varies across countries depending on different 
economic and institutional conditions. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to determine whether 
financial development causes economic growth in the Latin American region, and whether there 
are specific conditions that allow this to happen. 
 There is a vast literature on the analysis of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, but there are few empirical analyses that pool only Latin 
  
3  
 
American countries. Using a sample of 18 Latin American countries, with observations from 
1962 to 2005, this paper focuses on determining the way of causation between financial 
development and economic growth. This paper also explores whether the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth is different across countries with different economic 
and institutional conditions. The indicators of financial development used are private credit, 
liquid liabilities, and bank deposits as a share of GDP.  
 Using a vector autoregression (VAR) model, the Granger causality test supports the 
demand following hypothesis for the whole region. The impulse response functions (IRFs) show 
that a shock to GDP growth causes greater financial development, but a shock to financial 
development has no impact on GDP growth. These findings are robust to different measures of 
financial development and model specifications.  
When the sample is divided according to different income levels, there is two way 
causality only for the middle income group. When the sample is divided according to 
institutional setups, the same result is found for countries with stronger rule of law and creditor 
rights. While the flow from financial development to growth is weaker for the stronger rule of 
law and creditor rights sample than for the middle income sample, a shock to financial 
development causes greater economic growth for both subsamples. Although these findings 
support the argument that the finance-growth link is dependent on income levels and institutional 
settings, the impact of financial development on economic growth is relatively small for the 
middle income and higher institutional quality samples.      
To summarize, the main objectives of this analysis are to determine whether financial 
development causes economic growth in Latin America or vice versa, and whether the finance-
growth link is different across countries with different economic and institutional conditions in 
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this region. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature on the relationship between financial development and economic growth and an 
overview on financial development in Latin America; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 
outlines the model specification; Section 5 presents the empirical results; and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The Finance–Growth Link and the Latin American Case 
Financial Development and Economic Growth 
The level of financial development in a country is determined by the access that 
individuals have to credit and financial services. The primary function of the financial sector is to 
―facilitate the allocation of resources across space and time in an uncertain environment‖ (Levine 
1997, p. 691). Financial development also decreases market frictions that result from imperfect 
information by connecting savers with investors and by allocating resources to profitable projects 
(Demirguc-Kunt 2006). Therefore, the financial sector plays a crucial role in the economy 
because it provides relevant information, monitors investment projects, promotes risk 
diversification, increases the amount of transactions, and affects any entrepreneurial and trading 
activity (Levine 2005).  
A country is considered financially developed if it has a large financial sector that 
successfully connects savers with investors (Beck et al. 2001). In the empirical literature, 
financial development has been frequently measured using private credit issued by deposit 
money banks as a share of GDP. Private credit not only reveals the ability of the financial sector 
to reach businesses and to allocate resources to profitable projects, but also accounts for credit 
allocated only through private institutions to the private sector (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
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Levine 2000). Liquid liabilities and bank deposits as a share of GDP are commonly used as 
alternative measures of financial depth because they account for the use of financial institutions 
for everyday transactions and savings purposes. Liquid liabilities is the addition of currency and 
interest bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries and non-bank financial intermediaries, and 
bank deposits is the value of demand, time, and saving deposits in deposit money banks.  
Although these indicators are commonly used in the literature, they are not perfect 
measures of financial development. To measure financial development, it is required to use 
indicators that account for the quality and quantity of the financial services available to society. 
While private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank deposits as a share of GDP account for true 
financial development, they are also related to financial cycles, which are linked to the demand 
of financial services. In fact, it is argued that the fast expansion of private credit does not 
necessarily represent an improvement in the financial sector if this expansion leads to an increase 
in risk at the micro and macro level (Honohan 2004). Researchers acknowledge the limitations of 
the financial development indicators by using a group of indicators and econometric techniques 
that address for these issues. 
There is a debate about the causality between financial development and economic 
growth, with some arguing that financial development causes economic growth, while others 
assert that economic growth causes financial development. Supporters of the causation running 
from financial development to economic growth state that the characteristics of the financial 
sector are relevant for economic activity and base their argument on Schumpeter‘s view of 
financial development as creative destruction (Rajan and Zingales 2003). On the other hand, 
others argue that financial development may be the consequence of economic growth because 
developed economies create the demand for developed financial sectors (Shan 2005). Empirical 
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analyses on the relationship between financial development and economic growth use cross 
country, panel, and firm-industry data to support both sides of the debate. 
In a literature review on the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, Levine (2005) concludes that financial development causes economic growth. The 
channels through which financial development causes economic growth are productivity and 
capital accumulation (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). Financial development promotes the 
increase of technology because access to financial resources allows for labor specialization, 
which creates a virtuous cycle in the economy (Saint-Paul 1992). More efficient financial sectors 
are also associated with better resource allocation that leads to higher capital accumulation.
3
 
Cross country and panel empirical analyses support the supply-leading hypothesis by 
showing that the exogenous component of financial development has a positive effect on 
economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel 2000; Khan and 
Senhadji 2003; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000), productivity, and capital accumulation (King 
and Levine1993; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Nourzad 2002; Rioja and Valev 2004a). 
Analyses at the firm-industry level also support the argument that financial development is 
conducive to growth (Beck 2002; Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel 2007; Love 2003; Manning 
2003; Rajan and Zingales 1998).   
Although there is an extensive amount of work showing that financial development 
causes economic growth, others posit that financial development is just the consequence of 
economic growth. As stated by Shan, Morris, and Sun (2001), the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth may be a ‗chicken and the egg‘ problem since financial 
institutions are usually developed in developed countries (DCs) and underdeveloped in less 
developed countries (LDCs). The theoretical explanation behind this hypothesis is that there is a 
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virtuous cycle in developed economies, where an expansion in the real sector increases the 
demand for loanable funds (Berthélemy and Varoudakis 1996; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). 
The empirical record is mixed. 
While some empirical analyses show the bi-directional causality between financial 
development and economic growth (Berthélemy and Varoudakis 1996; Calderon and Liu 2003; 
Demetriades and Hussein 1996; Luintel and Khan 1999), others find no evidence that financial 
development causes economic growth (Ram 1999; Shan, Morris, and Sun 2001; Shan 2005). 
There is also empirical evidence showing that the effect of financial development on economic 
growth is different across regions (Al-Awad and Harb 2005; Habibullah and Eng 2006; Iyare 
Lorde, and Francis 2005; Naceur and Ghazouani 2007; Odhiambo 2007), income levels (Aghion, 
Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes 2005; Berthélemy and Varoudakis 1998; Andersen and Tarp 2003; 
Jung 1986; Ram 1999; Rioja and Valev 2004a; Xu 2000), levels of financial development (Rioja 
and Valev 2004b), and institutions (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1994; Shen and Lee 2006).  
There are three possible explanations for the heterogeneous effect of financial 
development. First, it is argued that the effect of financial development on economic growth is 
dependent on the country‘s level of economic development. According to Aghion, Howitt, and 
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), because firms in advanced countries are financially unconstrained, the 
steady state growth rate of these countries does not respond to improvements in the financial 
sector. On the other hand, for LDCs, the lower the level of financial development, the greater the 
―disadvantage of backwardness‖ the country faces due to credit constraints. Financial 
development allows LDCs to converge to the frontier growth rate, but a country can converge to 
the frontier growth rate only if financial development exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, 
financial development benefits the most, in terms of economic growth, those countries that are 
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not at the global technology frontier, and that have neither too low nor too high levels of 
financial development. 
Second, financial development may have a nonlinear effect on growth. The effect of 
financial development on growth is dependent on the level of financial development of a 
country. Rioja and Valev (2004b) find that financial development has a positive effect on growth 
once financial development has passed certain threshold, but this effect is diminishing once 
countries have achieved high levels of financial development. Economies of scale, risk pooling, 
and learning by doing explain why financial development has a positive effect on growth once a 
threshold level is achieved, while the law of diminishing returns explains why financial 
development has no effect on growth in countries with highly developed financial systems.    
Third, the effect of financial development on growth may be dependent on country 
conditions related to institutions, such as credit protection and law enforcement. Property rights 
institutions, which protect citizens against government power, are important determinants of 
financial development and economic growth (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). In fact, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) posit that the legal origin of a country has a significant 
impact on institutions, and consequently, on the level of financial development. Countries under 
common law have greater protection to investors than countries under civil law, and this may be 
one of the factors explaining why capital markets are more developed in common law countries 
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Therefore, the finance-growth link can be affected by the legal 
environment, where better institutions may allow financial development to spur economic 
growth.  
Under certain conditions, financial development has also been associated with lower 
economic growth (Berthélemy and Varoudakis 1998; De Gregorio and Guidoti 1995; Shen and 
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Lee 2006). A negative effect of financial development on growth is explained by the fact that 
financial development, specifically in the banking sector, may lead to lower saving rates or 
depress stock markets (Shen and Lee 2006). It is also argued that there is a negative effect of 
financial development on growth when there is financial repression (Berthélemy and Varoudakis 
1998), and when there is fast financial liberalization with poor regulation that leads to 
overlending (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995).
4
 Based on these explanations, the general 
consensus that financial development causes greater growth cannot be applied to all countries.   
Current research has also recognized the important role that macroeconomic volatility 
plays when analyzing the relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
Disentangling the effect of financial development on economic growth is difficult since several 
countries have experienced financial crises in periods in which they had a significant 
improvement in their financial sector. Some argue that the empirical evidence showing that 
financial development has no impact or a negative effect on economic growth may be due to the 
fact that the impact of financial development may be different across different time frames. Since 
emerging regions are likely to experience financial crises after financial liberalization, financial 
development in the short run may be negatively associated with economic growth. However, it is 
expected that the improvements on the financial sector, due to financial liberalization, have a 
positive impact in the long run once the country has stabilized (Loayza and Rancière 2006). 
Loayza and Rancière (2006) reconcile the banking crises with the financial intermediation 
literature by showing that the effect of financial development on economic growth is negative in 
the short run but positive in the long run.
5
 
The Latin American Case 
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 In most Latin American countries, the financial sector is bank based and the stock market 
is small. In the 1990s, the average level of credit to the private sector in Latin America was only 
28 percent of GDP, which is considerably smaller than that found in other developing regions 
(e.g. 72 percent for Asia and 43 percent for countries in the Middle East and North Africa; Inter- 
American Development Bank 2005).
6
 Although Latin American countries experienced financial 
liberalization, the financial sector in the region has not been able to catch up with other emerging 
regions. 
  Evidence shows that the lack of financial depth has characterized the Latin American 
region since independence. In the early 1900s capital markets and the banking system were 
extremely weak, which made the sources of credit limited and led to a high concentration in the 
financial sector.
7
 The underdevelopment of the financial system in the region has been attributed 
to short term lending strategies, the governments‘ inability to pay back their debt, and the legal 
framework that lacks contract enforcement (Levine 2000). The underdevelopment of the 
financial sector in Latin America today is also a consequence of the financial repression 
experienced in the region throughout the 1970s and 1980s. During these decades, Latin 
American governments used the banking sector to finance their budget deficits with borrowing 
and implicit taxation. Governments also used the banking sector to subsidize sectoral 
development projects and this produced a ―bias to refinance non-performing loans,‖ that 
―benefited bad banks and especially bad borrowers‖ (Mas 1995, p. 695).   
It is argued that the structural reforms implemented in Latin America during the 1990s 
have promoted the participation of the private sector in financial institutions (Loayza and 
Palacios 1997). However, Burki and Perri (1997) posit that these reforms did not make financial 
markets in the region more efficient, and that future reforms should focus on increasing 
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competition, reducing government participation, developing efficient bond and equity markets, 
and promoting foreign participation.
8
 In a comprehensive analysis of financial reforms in Latin 
America in the last two decades, Galindo, Micco, and Panizza (2007) conclude that reforms 
related to the legal framework, such as contract protection and creditor‘s rights, are required in 
order to further expand the financial sector and to allow this sector to have a real effect in the 
economy.         
 There are few empirical studies on the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth for the Latin American region. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), in a panel of 
12 Latin American countries between 1950 and 1985, find that financial development has a 
significant negative effect on economic growth. They argue that this finding was due to the fast 
financial liberalization experienced at the time and that without proper regulation, led to 
macroeconomic volatility. On the other hand, Nazmi (2005) finds, using a panel data of 5 Latin 
American countries from 1960 to 1995, that financial development has a significant positive 
effect on investment. Because there has been a significant change in the financial sector in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in Latin America (see Figure 1), it is important to analyze the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth using current data. By pooling 
only Latin American countries, which controls for cross-country heterogeneity, and using a 
sample period that includes current changes on the financial sector, this paper contributes 
significantly to the literature on the finance-growth link.
9
   
 
 
3. Data 
 The relationship between financial development and economic growth is analyzed in a 
panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1962 to 2005.
 
The countries included are: Argentina, 
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Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.
10
  
Economic growth is measured as the difference of the natural log of real GDP per capita 
(constant U.S. dollars).
11
 The natural log of private credit issued by deposit money banks as a 
share of GDP is the main measure of financial development used in this analysis.
12
 Liquid 
liabilities and bank deposits as a share of GDP (in logs) are used as alternative measures of 
financial development for robustness purposes.
13
 Financial development indicators for 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay were constructed following Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Levine (2000) formula, since they were not consistently available for the period of analysis 
in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000; October 2007 version) financial structure database. 
Financial development indicators for all the other countries were obtained from Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (2000) database.
14
 For robustness purposes, a set of control variables, similar 
to the one used in Loayza‘s and Rancière (2006) analysis, is included in the estimation (ratio of 
government consumption to GDP, ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and inflation; all in 
natural logs).  
The impact of financial development on growth is explored across countries with 
different economic and institutional conditions. To account for different economic conditions, 
following Rioja and Valev (2004a), the sample is divided in three groups according to their 
relative ranking in their GDP per capita (constant 2000 U.S. dollars) in the middle of the sample 
period.
15
 The sample is also divided according to institutional conditions. To account for 
institutional conditions, the average of the rule of law and creditor rights indices are estimated 
for each country during the period of analysis with the available observations.
16
 Tables 1 and 2 
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provide a detailed description, sources, and summary statistics of all variables. Table 3 shows the 
average institutional indices for each country and the country classification according to its 
relative income level. 
 
4. Model Specification 
To determine the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
growth, the Granger causality test in a VAR framework is used. The panel VAR model in this 
analysis has the following form: 
tiptiptititi TDYAYAYAcY ,,2,21,10, ............        (1) 
where c is a vector of constants and for each j = 0, 1,…p, Yi, t – j is a vector of variables 
evaluated at time t – j, A j is a matrix that gives the relationship among the variables at time t – j, 
while ε i, t is a vector of error terms for the country i in period t. D is a vector of country dummy 
variables and T is a vector of time effects. 
This VAR estimation includes fixed effects to control for cross country differences and 
time variation. The fixed effect approach to the Granger causality test in a panel VAR provides 
the advantage of accounting for individual heterogeneity by removing the average variation 
across countries and across time.
17
 
For the Granger causality test in a bivariate VAR, Yi, t – j is a vector of two variables: GDP 
growth (GDP) and financial development (FD) evaluated at time t – j. j is equal to 2 since this is 
the appropriate lag length according to the Schwarz information criterion (SIC).
18
 Based on this 
framework, the hypotheses that financial development does not Granger cause GDP growth, and 
that GDP growth does not Granger cause financial development are tested. Therefore, the null 
hypotheses of this test are  
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0......: 210 
FD
p
FDFDH  , where FD are the coefficients of financial development 
(FD) in periods t – p in the GDP growth equation. 
0......: 210 
GDP
p
GDPGDPH  , where GDP are the coefficients of GDP growth in 
periods t – p in the financial development equation. 
For the purpose of robustness, the Granger causality test is performed in a multivariate 
VAR, where Yi, t – j is a vector of six variables: GDP growth, financial development, government 
consumption, trade, and inflation (all in logs) evaluated at time t – j. 
This analysis also explores the dynamic behavior of economic growth and financial 
development in a panel framework following the methodology used by Love and Zicchino 
(2006). The panel VAR specified in equation (1) is estimated using a system General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, where lagged regressors are used as instruments.
19
 In this 
estimation, time fixed effects are eliminated by subtracting the means of each variable calculated 
for each country-year and forward mean differencing (Helmert procedure) is used to account for 
country fixed effects. Coefficients and IRFs are estimated using the system GMM.
20
 Because the 
IRFs capture the time path of shocks on financial development and economic growth, they help 
to determine the interaction between these two variables. The IRFs visually represent how GDP 
growth responds to a shock in financial development and vice versa.
21
 Therefore, the impulse 
response of GDP growth to a shock in financial development allows evaluating the effect of 
financial development booms on economic growth. This approach also allows evaluating how an 
economic boom impacts financial development.
 22
 
Although it is argued that time series techniques are biased in analyses that include few 
observations (small T), the results obtained from the panel VAR in this analysis are reliable. 
According to Beggs (1986) cross sectional data improves the reliability of time series techniques. 
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He shows that time series processes can be identified for samples that include at least 25 
observations and 5 countries.
23
 In this analysis, estimations include at least 6 countries and 33 
observations per country.
24
  
 
5. Empirical Results 
The Finance–Growth Link in Latin America  
 In Table 4, column 1 shows the results from the Granger causality test of the bivariate 
VAR model in a balanced panel framework with fixed effects for the full sample using 2 lags 
and 3 different measures of financial development, one at the time.
25
 There is evidence of one 
way causality, where GDP growth causes financial development, and this finding is robust to 
different measures of financial development. The hypothesis that financial development does not 
Granger cause GDP growth cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level, and the hypothesis that 
GDP growth does not Granger cause financial development is rejected at the 1 percent level. 
This result is robust to expanding the number of lags to 4 (Table 4, column 2).  
 Because there could be an omitted variable bias in the bivariate VAR that country and 
time dummies cannot fully account for, the Granger causality test is performed in a multivariate 
VAR to check for robustness. The variables included in the estimation, besides GDP growth and 
financial development, are government consumption as a share of GDP, trade as a share of GDP, 
and inflation (all in logs). This estimation excludes Panama and uses a shorter sample period 
(1970 to 2005) due to data unavailability. In Table 4, columns 3 and 4 also show one way 
causation from GDP growth to financial development. When using 2 and 4 lags, the hypothesis 
that economic growth does not Granger cause financial development is rejected at the 1 and 5 
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percent level, respectively. We fail to reject at the 10 percent level that financial development 
does not Granger cause GDP growth in the multivariate VAR using 2 and 4 lags.
26
   
In order to determine whether previous results are driven by a specific country, the Jack-
knife approach is used. The Granger causality test is performed 18 times, each time excluding 
observations from one country. Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the Granger causality 
tests, excluding one country at the time, using private credit as a measure of financial 
development and 2 lags. In all cases, for the bivariate VAR, the hypothesis that GDP growth 
does not Granger cause financial development is rejected at the 1 percent level, but the 
hypothesis that financial development does not Granger cause GDP growth cannot be rejected at 
the 10 percent level.
27
 These results are consistent to the country-by-country Jack-knife Granger 
causality test in the multivariate VAR (Table 5).
28
  
Since Garcia-Herrero et al. (2002) argue that Chile and Panama are more financially 
developed than other Latin American countries, it is important to explore whether results in the 
Granger causality test hold when we exclude these countries from the estimation. The Granger 
causality test in a bivariate VAR with 2 lags, using private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank 
deposits as a share of GDP (one at the time, all in logs), shows that the hypothesis that economic 
growth does not Granger cause financial development is rejected at the 1, 2, and 6 percent level. 
In all cases, the hypothesis that financial development does not Granger cause GDP growth 
cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.
29
  
 To further understand how financial development and economic growth influence each 
other in Latin America, the system GMM and IRFs are estimated. Tables 6 and 7 show the 
coefficients and standard errors for the bivariate and multivariate VAR estimations using the 
system GMM and 3 different financial indicators (one at the time). In the bivariate VAR 
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estimation (Table 6, column 1), when using private credit as a share of GDP, financial 
development has no significant effect on economic growth, but economic growth has an effect 
on financial development. Estimates show that the first lag of GDP growth has a significant 
positive effect on financial development at the 1 percent level, and the second lag of GDP 
growth has a significant negative effect on financial development at the 5 percent level. An 
increase on GDP growth by one standard deviation (0.0425) causes private credit as a share of 
GDP to increase by 0.03 the next period and to decrease by 0.01 in the second period after the 
initial increase on GDP growth. Therefore, the net effect of an increase on economic growth by 
one standard deviation on private credit is 0.02 after 2 years. The net effect of growth on 
financial development is very small when compared with the standard deviation of private credit 
(0.6455). These results are similar using other financial development indicators. When using 
liquid liabilities and bank deposits as a share of GDP (columns 2 and 3), a one standard deviation 
increase on GDP growth has a positive effect on financial development of 0.02 the next period. 
Coefficients size and significance are similar in the multivariate VAR estimates shown in Table 
7.  
IRFs and 5 percent error bands are generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 
repetitions. Figure 2 shows the IRFs when using 2 lags and private credit as a share of GDP in 
the bivariate VAR model. A shock in financial development has no impact on GDP growth, but a 
shock in economic growth leads to greater financial development. The effect of GDP growth on 
financial development effect fades away by year 5. For the multivariate VAR, IRFs are presented 
in Figure 3 and they are similar to those shown in Figure 2. The only difference in Figure 3 is 
that the effect of GDP growth on financial development fades away by year 3 (approximately).
30
 
Evidence from the impulse response of GDP growth to a shock on financial development helps 
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to disentangle the impact of a financial boom in the real sector. This impulse response shows that 
a private credit boom does not lead to greater economic growth for the full sample. Therefore, 
what is evaluated here is the response of economic growth to financial development in the short 
run. The impulse response of financial development to a GDP growth shock shows how financial 
development responds to an economic boom. Evidence from this impulse response supports the 
argument that financial development follows economic booms.     
To summarize, empirical evidence from the granger causality test, system GMM, and 
IRFs supports the argument that financial development follows GDP growth, and that financial 
development does not cause GDP growth in the Latin American region. This result is robust to 
using different financial development indicators (private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank 
deposits as a share of GDP), model specifications (bivariate and multivariate VAR), lags (2 and 
4), and samples (Jack-knife approach). 
In this section, it is important to note that there may be specific reasons why causality 
does not run from financial development to growth, and it cannot be concluded that financial 
development has no impact on growth per se. As argued by Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), 
this finding may be due to the fact that financial resources are not being allocated to productive 
activities as a result of political interference. Furthermore, Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) 
also posit that financial development has no real effect in the economy if there is macroeconomic 
and political instability. For this reasons, it is necessary to explore the impact of financial 
development on growth across countries with different economic and institutional conditions. 
 
The Finance–Growth Link across Countries with Different Conditions   
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 In the analysis of the relationship between financial development and economic growth, 
many have argued that the effect of financial development on growth may vary across countries 
with different conditions. To evaluate this, economic and institutional conditions are taken into 
consideration. To determine whether there is a heterogeneous effect of financial development on 
growth that is dependent on economic conditions, Granger causality test and system GMM are 
estimated for high, middle, and low income countries separately. Furthermore, the finance-
growth link across countries with different institutions is analyzed by taking away from the 
sample those countries with low indices of rule of law and creditor rights. There are 3 
subsamples based on institutional set ups for which the granger causality test and the system 
GMM are estimated. The first estimation excludes those countries with a rule of law index below 
the sample mean minus one half standard deviation. The second estimation excludes those 
countries with a creditor rights index below the sample mean minus one half standard deviation. 
The third sample includes only those countries with both indices above the sample mean minus 
one half standard deviation (see Table 3 for country classification).
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 Table 8 shows the Granger causality test estimated for the three different subsamples 
based on relative income levels, using private credit as a share of GDP and 2 lags. For the high 
and low income group, results are similar to those found for the full sample, where there is 
evidence of one way causality running from GDP growth to financial development. Interestingly, 
a two way causality is present only for middle income countries. For the middle income sample, 
the hypotheses that financial development does not granger cause GDP growth and that GDP 
growth does not cause financial development are rejected at the 1 percent level. The system 
GMM estimates for each subsample are shown in Table 9. Only for the middle income group 
(Table 9, column 3), financial development has a significant effect on GDP growth. Based on 
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estimates on column 3, for the middle income group it is found that an increase on financial 
development by one standard deviation (0.6455) leads to an increase on GDP growth of 0.04 in 
the next period and a decrease of 0.03 in the second period after the initial increase on financial 
development. Therefore, the net effect of an increase on financial development by one standard 
deviation on GDP growth is 0.01 after 2 years. The economic significance of the impact of 
financial development on GDP growth is relatively small since this effect represents one fourth 
of the standard deviation of GDP growth. Furthermore, the impulse response of GDP growth to a 
shock on financial development shows that GDP growth responds positively to a shock on 
financial development only for the middle income group, where the positive impact of financial 
development on economic growth vanishes by year 4 (Figure 4).     
Table 10 shows the Granger causality test when splitting the sample based on 
institutional set ups (using private credit as a share of GDP and 2 lags). There is evidence that 
GDP growth causes financial development in all cases. The hypothesis that financial 
development does not granger cause GDP growth is rejected at the 10 percent level for the 
subsample that includes those countries with higher rule of law index and for the subsample that 
considers only those countries with higher rule of law and creditor rights indices. The system 
GMM estimates for these three subsamples are shown in Table 11. Only for those countries with 
higher rule of law and creditor rights indices (column 3), financial development has a marginal 
significant effect on GDP growth. The impact of financial development on growth is also small 
for this subsample since an increase on financial development by one standard deviation leads to 
an increase on GDP growth by 0.03 in the next period and a decrease of 0.02 in the second 
period after the increase on financial development. Therefore, the net effect of an increase on 
financial development by one standard deviation is equal to 0.01 after 2 years, which is the same 
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as the one found for the middle income group. Looking at the IRFs, Figure 5 shows that a shock 
to financial development has a positive impact on GDP growth only for those countries with 
stronger rule of law and creditor rights.
32
  
 
6. Conclusion   
 There are two main empirical findings. First, for the full sample there is one way 
causality between financial development and GDP growth, where GDP growth causes financial 
development. Second, this result changes once the sample is separated according to economic 
and institutional conditions. While GDP growth causes financial development in all cases, 
financial development causes GDP growth only for the middle income and the stronger rule of 
law and creditor rights samples. While the causal flow from financial development to growth is 
weaker for the group with stronger rule of law and creditor rights indices than for the middle 
income group, the net effect of financial development on growth is relatively small for both 
subsamples.      
This analysis provides support for the argument that financial development follows 
economic growth and that the impact of financial development on growth may be different 
across countries with different conditions. These results support Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005), Rioja‘s and Valev (2004a) and Shen‘s and Lee (2006) findings on the 
heterogeneous effect of financial development on growth. Furthermore, evidence shows that 
greater financial development may not necessarily lead to greater economic growth for all 
countries in the Latin American region.  
Research must focus on further understanding the complementary conditions that allow 
financial development to have a positive effect on economic growth. In the case of Latin 
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American countries, while growth seems to follow financial development for the middle income 
and higher institutional quality samples, the impact of financial development on growth is 
relatively small. Perhaps there is a threshold of income level and governance that will allow 
financial development to affect growth by a significant magnitude. Further research must be 
done in order to determine the threshold levels of income and governance indicators required for 
financial development to have a positive and quantitatively significant impact on the real sector. 
 To further understand the finance-growth link in Latin America, it is also important to 
use an empirical approach that takes into consideration the short and long run relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. Since Latin American countries have 
experienced fast financial liberalization and great macroeconomic volatility, it is expected that 
the effect of financial development on economic growth may be different across different time 
frames. Therefore, it is important to distinguish how GDP growth responds to financial 
development booms (short run) and continuous improvements in the financial sector over a long 
period of time (long run).  
When looking at the finance-growth link across different time frames, it will be important 
to determine whether a positive shock to financial development increases the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. Additionally, exploring the finance-growth link at different periods, especially 
during the period where Latin American countries experienced fast financial liberalization and 
large capital inflows, will be an interesting task to look at once more data is available.     
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Endnotes 
1
 Author‘s calculation using data from this analysis. 
2
 Garcia Herrero et al. (2002) and Galindo, Micco, and Panizza (2007) present evidence of this. 
3
 Ju and Wei (2005) developed the wooden barrel theory of international trade, where economic 
growth depends on the financial sector if the finance constraint is binding. 
4
 Financial repression refers to the strong government intervention in the financial sector. See 
next section for further explanation on financial repression for the Latin American case. 
5
 Loayza and Rancière (2006) do an excellent job reviewing the banking crises and financial 
development literature; see their work for further reference on this.  
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6 
Garcia Herrero et al. (2002, p.23) note that in 2000 ―the stock market in Latin America is only 
one fourth of Asia‘s in terms of capitalization, even after the Asian crisis.‖ 
7
 In 1914, while Argentina had a bank deposits per head in U.S. dollars of 75.5 and Guatemala 
had 0.9, Australia and Canada had 150.3 and 142.9 respectively (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, p. 98). 
8
 De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2006) argue that reforms in the financial sector should also 
focus on helping the small and medium enterprise.    
9
 Grier and Tullock (1989) show the importance of pooling only countries from the same region 
in empirical analyses. To my knowledge, there is no analysis on the finance-growth link in Latin 
America that includes data from late 1990s and early 2000s and a comprehensive sample of 
countries.   
10
 Other Latin American countries were excluded due to the lack of data to construct financial 
development indicators. Brazil was left out due to lack of data, but since its financial system is 
comparable to the one in the United States (Allen and Gale 2000) it is reasonable to exclude this 
country. 
11
 When using real GDP in a panel framework it is important to have a measure that is 
comparable across countries. Loayza and Rancière (2006) use a measure of GDP in purchasing 
power parity adjusted 1985 dollars. Since this measure of GDP is not available for Latin 
American countries for the period of analysis (this measure is only available after 1980), I use 
the closest indicator that is available for the sample period, which is the GDP per capita in 2000 
U.S. dollars. GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars is constructed using the Atlas method, which allows 
smoothing exchange rate fluctuations by using a three year moving average price adjusted 
conversion factor.    
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12
 Private credit as a share of GDP is the most commonly used measure of financial development 
(Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). 
13
 For GDP growth, and the natural log of private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank deposits as a 
share of GDP, the hypothesis that the series are non-stationary is rejected at the 5 percent level 
using the Levin, Lin, and Chu common unit root test. See Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) for an 
explanation of this panel-based unit root test and its power. Financial development indicators are 
highly correlated (coefficient correlation between 0.80 and 0.94). 
14
 Missing observations for Colombia were filled in with linear interpolation. The indicators 
constructed for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru are highly correlated to Beck‘s, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) available observations (coefficient correlation is 0.99). 
15
 1984 is considered the middle of the sample period. 
16
 This approach of measuring institutional quality is similar to Galindo‘s and Micco (2007) 
approach. 
17
 In this fixed effect estimation, the individual effect is estimated for each country i in period t. 
This method removes the unobserved effects that are correlated with the explanatory variables to 
address the omitted variable bias (Wooldridge 2002). Holtz, Newey, and Rosen (1988) mention 
the advantages of using fixed effects in panel VAR estimations.   
18
 Since the SIC can be biased when finding too few lags, j equal to 4 is also explored in this 
analysis (4 lags is the adequate number of lags according to the Akaike information criterion). 
Results are the same regardless of the lag length used.  
19
 The number of regressors equals the number of instruments in the system GMM. 
20
 System GMM and IRFs are estimated in STATA using Love‘s and Zichinno (2006) code. 
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21
 For the system GMM estimation and IRFs one observation is lost with the Helmert 
transformation, where the available observations for estimation are between 1963 and 2005 in 
the bivariate VAR and between 1971 and 2005 in the multivariate VAR. 
22
 Loayza and Rancière (2006) also include as control variable the initial value of the ratio of 
total GDP to total population. To control for initial income in this analysis it will be required to 
use a time variant variable. I construct a time variant version of initial income, where for every 5 
year period the initial GDP per capita is the ratio of real GDP to population in the initial year of 
the 5 year period. Results from Granger causality tests are the same if this variable is included in 
the analysis and are available upon request. Note that variables are transformed using country-
year and forward mean differencing for the GMM estimation, and this transformation will not be 
adequate for a variable that varies every 5 years like the initial income variable discussed 
previously. For this reason, this analysis excludes initial income. The exclusion of initial income 
from the estimations is not problematic since cross country differences are controlled for with the 
inclusion of fixed effects. 
23
 Beggs (1986) argues that the bias associated with a short time series sample is reduced when 
we pool cross-sectional units and the estimator is efficient. He shows that, with the panel 
approach, the sampling variance of the estimator is reduced. More recent papers also present 
evidence on the importance of using long time series for consistency and power (Hahn and 
Newey 2004; Levin, Lin, and Chu 2002; Peasaran and Smith 1995).   
24
 According to Enders (2004, p.335) ―cointegration necessitates that two variables be integrated 
of the same order.‖ Since financial development indicators (in logs) are stationary, there is no 
need to test for cointegration between financial development indicators (in logs) and GDP 
growth in this analysis.      
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25
 All estimations use a balanced panel and the natural log of the financial development 
indicators. 
26
 The sign of the causal effect in the Granger causality test is shown in Table 4, where the sum 
of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressors are included in brackets. 
27
 The same results are obtained in the bivariate VAR country-by-country Jack-knife when using 
4 lags and private credit (in logs) as a share of GDP. Results not included for purpose of space.  
Table 5 includes the summary statistics of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressors. 
28
 The Jack-knife Granger causality test shows that the patterns of causation are similar across 
different sets of countries, but it does not strongly prove that causation patterns are the same in 
all countries. In fact, other empirical evidence has shown that the finance-growth link is country-
specific (Iyare, Lorde, and Francis 2005; Odhiambo 2007).  
29
 Results not include for brevity. 
30
 IRFs obtained when using 3 different measures of financial development for the bivariate and 
multivariate VAR show the same behavior as those shown in figures 2 and 3, where a shock to 
financial development has no effect on GDP growth, but a shock on GDP growth has a positive 
effect on financial development. Results are also robust to using 4 lags 
31
 All countries with a creditor rights index above zero are included in the estimation. The 
threshold to include countries in the estimation (index above mean minus one half standard 
deviation) was chosen with the purpose to keep a large amount of countries in the estimation and 
maintain consistent estimates. Trinidad and Tobago is not included in the estimations for the 
subsamples that take into consideration institutions due to the lack of data on creditor rights.       
32
 Granger causality tests were also estimated for those countries with low rule of law and low 
creditor rights indices. For both samples, there is evidence of one way causality running from 
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GDP growth to financial development. Results not included for brevity, but are available upon 
request. Impulse response of financial development to a GDP growth shock not included for 
brevity. For all subsamples, there is evidence that a shock to GDP growth has a positive effect on 
financial development. 
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Table 1. Variables description 
    
  
Variable Description 
  
GDP growth Log difference of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars). 
Source: Author's construction using World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2008). 
 
Private credit
a
 Ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (natural log). 
Source: Author's construction and Beck‘s, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
database.  
 
Liquid 
liabilities
a
 
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (natural log). 
Source: Author's construction and Beck‘s, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
database.  
 
Bank 
deposits
a
 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share of GDP 
(natural log). 
Source: Author's construction and Beck‘s, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
database.  
 
Government Ratio of government consumption to GDP (natural log). Missing observations for 
Argentina, from 1980 to 1986, were filled in with linear interpolation. 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). 
 
Trade Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (natural log). 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). 
 
Inflation Annual percentage change in CPI plus 100 (natural log).  
Source: Author's construction using World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2008). 
 
Rule of law 
index 
Average rule of law index (1996-2005).  The index ranges from -2.5 (weak rule of 
law) to 2.5 (strong rule of law).  
Source: Author‘s construction using Kaufmann‘s, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) 
governance data. 
 
Creditor 
rights index 
Average of creditor rights index (1978-2003). The index ranges from 0 (weak 
creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Source: Author‘s construction using Djankov's, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) 
data. 
 
  
a 
Author's construction of financial indicators for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay 
using the International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2008) and Beck's, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) formula. Data for all the other countries obtained directly from 
Beck's, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) database (October 2007 version). Missing observations 
for Colombia, in years 1986, 1987, 1989, and 1990, were filled in with linear interpolation. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
          
         
   Mean  Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
 
Bivariate estimation, 1962-2005, 18 countries, 792 obs. 
GDP growth 0.0135 0.0425 0.1505 -0.1651 
Private credit (in logs) -1.7747 0.6455 -0.0271 -4.2219 
Liquid liabilities (in logs) -1.3978 0.4385 -0.1910 -3.1097 
Bank deposits (in logs) -1.7339 0.5962 -0.2451 -4.0981 
     
Multivariate estimation, 1970-2005, 17 countries, 612 obs. 
GDP growth 0.0117 0.0435 0.1505 -0.1613 
Private credit (in logs) -1.7323 0.5498 -0.4423 -3.9112 
Liquid liabilities (in logs) -1.3476 0.4075 -0.3695 -3.1097 
Bank deposits (in logs) -1.6512 0.5024 -0.5188 -4.0981 
Government (in logs) 2.3615 0.3318 3.1355 1.0986 
Trade (in logs) 3.8940 0.4726 4.8752 2.3026 
Inflation (in log[100+inf.rate]) 4.8355 0.4417 9.3801 4.4886 
          
     
 
 
 
Table 3. Income group classification and average rule of law and creditor rights indices 
              
        
Country Rule of 
law 
(RL) 
Creditor 
rights 
(CR) 
Income 
group 
Country Rule of 
law 
(RL) 
Creditor 
rights 
(CR) 
Income 
group 
Argentina -0.38
a
 1.00
a
 High Haiti -1.60 2.00
a
 Low 
Bolivia -0.47
a
 2.00
a
 Low Honduras -0.83 2.00
a
 Low 
Chile 1.17
a
 2.00
a
 Middle Mexico -0.43
a
 0.00 High 
Colombia -0.80 0.00 Middle Panama -0.14
a
 4.00
a
 High 
Costa Rica 0.61
a
 1.00
a
 Middle Paraguay -0.98 1.00
a
 Low 
Dom. Rep. -0.54
a
 2.00
a
 Middle Peru -0.64
a
 0.00 Middle 
Ecuador -0.66
a
 0.00 Low Trin. & Tob. 0.21
a
 -- High 
El Salvador -0.57
a
 3.00
a
 Middle Uruguay 0.50
a
 2.08
a
 High 
Guatemala -0.94 1.00
a
 Low Venezuela -1.00 3.00
a
 High 
              
a
Country with an index higher than the sample mean minus one half standard deviation. Income 
group classification based on the relative ranking of a country‘s GDP per capita (constant 2000 
U.S. dollars) in the middle of the sample period (year 1984). Creditor rights index not available for 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Table 4. Bivariate and Multivariate VAR – Granger causality F-values and probabilitiesa 
          
 Bivariate Multivariate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Null Hypothesis: Financial development does not Granger-cause GDP growth 
     
Private credit 0.978 0.362 0.513 0.246 
 (0.377) (0.836) (0.599) (0.912) 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Liquid liabilities 1.598 1.435 0.520 0.788 
 (0.203) (0.221) (0.595) (0.534) 
 [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.001] [0.002] 
Bank deposits 1.783 1.359 0.376 0.536 
 (0.169) (0.247) (0.687) (0.710) 
 [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.003] [-0.003] 
     
Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
     
Private credit 15.192 8.049 12.216 5.870 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.329]  [0.237]  [0.379]  [0.260]  
Liquid liabilities 8.086 5.072 5.685 2.956 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.020) 
 [0.326]  [0.304]  [0.474]  [0.403]  
Bank deposits 6.498 4.441 6.355 3.175 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
 [0.347]  [0.341]  [0.551]  [0.479]  
     
Number of countries 18 18 17 17 
Sample period 1964-2005 1966-2005 1972-2005 1974-2005 
Observations (each equation) 756 720 578 544 
k (lag number) 2 4 2 4 
     
a
F-values with probabilities in parenthesis and the sum of the coefficients of the causally prior 
lagged regressors in brackets. Granger test estimated with country-time fixed effects and one 
financial development indicator at the time (in logs).  
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Table 5. Jack-knife Granger causality test (bivariate and multivariate VAR)
a
 
            
      
  Mean Med. Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Bivariate VAR      
Null Hypothesis: Financial development does not Granger-cause GDP growth 
      
F-Statistic 1.030 1.063 0.445 0.035 2.164 
Probability 0.393 0.346 0.193 0.116 0.966 
Financial development t-1 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.017 
Financial development t-2 -0.007 -0.007 0.003 -0.011 0.000 
      
Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
      
F-Statistic 14.436 14.559 1.888 9.856 17.616 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GDP growth t-1 0.610 0.616 0.034 0.509 0.658 
GDP growth t-2 -0.282 -0.282 0.060 -0.395 -0.152 
      
Multivariate VAR      
Null Hypothesis: Financial development does not Granger-cause GDP growth 
      
F-Statistic 0.582 0.537 0.248 0.133 1.065 
Probability 0.575 0.585 0.140 0.345 0.876 
Financial development t-1 0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.007 0.010 
Financial development t-2 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.007 
      
Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
      
F-Statistic 11.120 11.102 2.101 6.894 14.212 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
GDP growth t-1 0.703 0.714 0.076 0.509 0.804 
GDP growth t-2 -0.328 -0.327 0.082 -0.515 -0.177 
            
a
Jack-Knife Granger causality test using private credit share as a share of GDP (in 
logs), k = 2, and country-time fixed effects. For the bivariate VAR, each F statistic was 
estimated 18 times for N-1 of the countries in the sample; 714 observations (each 
equation). For the multivariate VAR, each F statistic was estimated 17 times for N-1 of 
the countries in the sample; 544 observations (each equation).  
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Table 6. Bivariate VAR (coefficients and standard errors)
a
 
        
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dependent variable: GDP growth 
    
Financial development t-1 0.010 0.014 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) 
Financial development t-2 -0.009 -0.026 -0.022* 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
GDP growth t-1 0.254*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
    
    
Dependent variable: Financial development 
    
GDP growth t-1 0.602*** 0.382*** 0.414*** 
 (0.125) (0.117) (0.115) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.299** -0.075 -0.069 
 (0.137) (0.107) (0.116) 
Financial development t-1 1.404*** 1.304*** 1.298*** 
 (0.051) (0.074) (0.098) 
Financial development t-2 -0.476*** -0.378*** -0.369*** 
 (0.045) (0.058) (0.075) 
    
a
VAR model estimated by GMM; country-time fixed effects are removed before 
estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank 
deposits as a share of GDP (in logs) used as financial development measures in 
columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively (one at the time). Each equation estimated with 18 
countries and using observations from 1965 to 2005; 738 observations each equation 
(k=2). ‗***‘, ‗**‘, '*" significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. Multivariate VAR (coefficients and standard errors)
a
 
        
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dependent variable: GDP growth 
    
Financial development t-1 0.016 0.023 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) 
Financial development t-2 -0.011 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) 
GDP growth t-1 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.207*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.077 -0.077 -0.079 
 (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) 
    
    
Dependent variable: Financial development 
    
GDP growth t-1 0.613*** 0.357** 0.451** 
 (0.216) (0.176) (0.216) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.424** 0.062 0.014 
 (0.202) (0.142) (0.168) 
Financial development t-1 1.381*** 1.281*** 1.297*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.082) 
Financial development t-2 -0.466*** -0.322*** -0.365*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.066) 
    
a
VAR model estimated by GMM; country-time fixed effects are removed before 
estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank 
deposits as a share of GDP (in logs) used as financial development measures in 
columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively (one at the time). Coefficients and standard errors for 
other variables (government, trade, and inflation) are omitted for space purposes. Each 
equation estimated with 17 countries and using observations from 1973 to 2005; 561 
observations each equation (k=2). ‗***‘, ‗**‘, '*" significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level. 
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Table 8. Granger causality F-values and probabilities by income groups
a
 
         
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Null Hypothesis: Financial development does not Granger-cause GDP growth 
    
 0.342 1.153 8.388 
 (0.711) (0.318) (0.000) 
    
Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
    
 5.614 2.665 16.049 
 (0.004) (0.072) (0.000) 
    
Sample (number of countries) High (6) Low (6) Middle (6) 
    
a
F-values with probabilities in parenthesis. Granger test performed in the bivariate VAR using 
private credit as a share of GDP (in logs), k=2, observations from 1964 to 2005 (252 
observations each equation), and country-time fixed effects. 
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Table 9.  Bivariate VAR by income groups – coefficients and standard errorsa  
        
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth   
    
Financial development t-1 -0.028 0.021 0.065** 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.027) 
Financial development t-2 0.017 -0.019 -0.043* 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) 
GDP growth t-1 0.182* 0.116* 0.328*** 
 (0.101) (0.065) (0.093) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.034 0.106 -0.168** 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.082) 
    
    
Dependent variable: Financial development  
    
GDP growth t-1 0.547*** 0.271 0.919*** 
 (0.207) (0.221) (0.211) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.375* 0.553** -0.838*** 
 (0.193) (0.224) (0.249) 
Financial development t-1 1.378*** 1.395*** 1.482*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.098) 
Financial development t-2 -0.490*** -0.474*** -0.543*** 
 (0.060) (0.078) (0.080) 
    
Sample (number of countries) High (6) Low (6) Middle (6) 
        
a
VAR model estimated by GMM; country-time fixed effects are removed before 
estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimation used private credit as a share 
of GDP (in logs) and observations from 1965 to 2005; 246 observations each equation 
(k=2). ‗***‘, ‗**‘, '*" significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 10. Granger causality F-values and probabilities by institutional quality groups
a
 
        
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Null Hypothesis: Financial development does not Granger-cause GDP growth 
    
 2.780 1.374 2.467 
 (0.063) (0.254) (0.087) 
    
Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
    
 10.197 12.096 9.616 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Sample (number of countries) RL (11) CR (13) RL and CR (8) 
Observations (each equation) 462 546 336 
    
a
F-values with probabilities in parenthesis. Granger test performed in the bivariate VAR using 
private credit as a share of GDP (in logs), k=2, observations from 1964 to 2005, and country-
time fixed effects.  
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Table 11.  Bivariate VAR by institutional quality groups – Coefficients and standard 
errors
a
 
        
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth   
    
Financial development t-1 0.028 0.018 0.040* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) 
Financial development t-2 -0.018 -0.015 -0.029* 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
GDP growth t-1 0.270*** 0.224*** 0.263*** 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.070) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.076 -0.034 -0.085 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.060) 
    
    
Dependent variable: Financial development  
    
GDP growth t-1 0.652*** 0.641*** 0.779*** 
 (0.150) (0.131) (0.157) 
GDP growth t-2 -0.328* -0.251* -0.239* 
 (0.172) (0.149) (0.182) 
Financial development t-1 1.416*** 1.371*** 1.364*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.082) 
Financial development t-2 -0.490*** -0.449*** -0.448*** 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.061) 
    
Sample (number of countries) RL (11) CR (13) RL and CR (8) 
Observations (each equation) 451 533 328 
        
a
VAR model estimated by GMM; country-time fixed effects are removed before estimation. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimation used private credit as a share of GDP (in logs) 
and observations from 1965 to 2005. Column 1 includes countries where the rule of law index 
is higher than the sample mean minus one half standard deviation. Column 2 includes countries 
where the creditor rights index is higher than the sample mean minus one half standard 
deviation. Column 3 includes countries where the rule of law and creditor rights indices are 
both higher than the sample mean minus one half standard deviation. ‗***‘, ‗**‘, '*" 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Figure 1: Financial Development in 18 Latin American Countries (1962-2005) 
Figure 2: Impulse-responses for two lags bivariate VAR  
Figure 3: Impulse-responses for two lags multivariate VAR 
Figure 4: Impulse-response of GDP growth to FD shock by income groups 
Figure 5: Impulse-response of GDP growth to FD shock by institutional quality groups 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
